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Abstract

This article examines whether elections for state offices that regulate mortgage lenders affect mortgage
markets. Some scholars assert that election-related political uncertainty depresses economic activity; others contend that incumbents pursue policies to boost short-term growth prior to elections; and a third
group claims that market activity fluctuates around partisan transitions. We test these theories using
national data on mortgage characteristics and election data for two important state regulators. We first
conduct event studies comparing mortgage market outcomes before and after elections. We then utilize
difference-in-difference models to compare states in which partisan control of key offices switched following an election. Our results do not show consistent support for any of these theories. We find that elections
have few significant effects on mortgage markets, suggesting that delegating regulatory power to elected
state officials may be efficient.
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This study probes the relationship between elections and mortgage-market activity. State elected officials
and their appointees play a prominent role in regulating residential mortgage lenders—giving state officeholders seeking to make their mark on mortgage finance no shortage of levers to pull.1 They are the primary
regulators of state-chartered lenders; enforce a host of state laws against nationally chartered lenders;2 are
authorized to enforce federal lending laws against all lenders; and are the only regulator of non-bank lenders
that originate over 50 percent of all residential mortgages.
These state officials may face pressure to adopt an electorally advantageous regulatory posture. Lenders,
in turn, may react to these official positions, as well as uncertainty over which candidate, and thus which
regulatory stance, will prevail in an upcoming election. In this way, election-related uncertainty and partisan swings in policy could raise compliance costs, discourage lenders from originating loans that would be
economically viable in a stable regulatory environment, and thus slow the economy (Agarwal, Lucca, Seru,
& Trebbi 2013).
A substantial literature in political economy and related fields states that political officeholders’ electoral
incentives can distort financial markets and lessen the efficacy of regulation. These officials, directly or
through their appointees, may vary their oversight of financial institutions based on their party’s ideological
posture (Mian, Sufi, & Trebbi 2010). Growing partisan polarization at the state level (Caughey, Warshaw,
& Xu 2017) may amplify this variance. State officials also may pursue policies to bolster economic growth
leading up to their reelection campaigns, taking their foot off the gas afterwards (Nordhaus 1975). Further,
greater political uncertainty may generate contractions in economic activity prior to elections, including in
high risk mortgage lending (Kara & Yook 2019).
Drawing on this literature, we present a taxonomy of theories predicting that electoral pressures generate
distortions in financial markets. We then test each theory using detailed data on mortgage origination and
performance in the U.S. between 2004 and 2013. The first theory, the Political Uncertainty Account, holds that
political uncertainty—for instance, in the lead-up to an election—dampens firms’ investment behavior (see,
e.g., Pastor & Veronesi 2012). The Political Business Cycle Account, by contrast, points to officials’ incentives
to use the policy levers at their disposal to facilitate short-term economic growth in the lead-up to their
next election (Nordhaus 1975). Finally, the Partisan Differences Account posits that the different policies that
Democratic versus Republican officeholders pursue generates differences in firm-level or macroeconomic
1 A complex patchwork of federal and state agencies regulate and, in many cases, supervise lenders based on their legal form. A
second set of federal and state agencies police lenders’ consumer-facing activities. Should a borrower default, a third set of government
actors, this time at the state level, oversees the foreclosure process (Feinstein, 2018).
2 These laws concern predatory lending, unfair and deceptive practices, information disclosure, and mortgage servicing.
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variables around electoral transitions (Alesina 1987).
Mortgage markets provide an ideal test case for these theories. That they are regulated to a significant extent by state officials allows for state-level analysis, which provides greater statistical power than analyses
that focus on quadrennial presidential elections. Further, virtually all residential mortgages are secured by
a property located in a single state, meaning that this study better captures only in-state political effects
relative to studies that examine the effects of in-jurisdiction elections on economic or securities-market activities that span multiple states or countries. Finally, the rich data on multiple mortgage features employed
here allows for the running of multiple models as a validity check.
Accordingly, to assess these theories we examine changes in mortgage lenders’ behavior around state elections for governor and attorney general (“AG”). These two positions play important—and, for AGs, overlooked—roles in regulating mortgage markets. Our analysis does not provide consistent support for any
of the predominant theories of electoral politics and financial markets. Virtually all of our tests yield null
results. The few significant political impacts we observe in our data do not accord with existing theories of
electoral politics. Our results suggest that state-level political pressures do not generate significant distortions and inefficiencies in the regulation and function of mortgage markets. Accordingly, it may be possible
to provide state officials with greater authority to regulate the growing “shadow bank sector” without
generating substantial politically-induced market distortions.
This article proceeds as follows. Section I provides an overview of the major theories concerning how
elections affect economic activity. Section II describes the outsized role that state governors and AGs play
in regulating their states’ mortgage markets, thus showing the particular suitability of their elections in
assessing these theories. Section III develops hypotheses based on these theories and details our research
design. Sections IV and V present the results and highlight several implications.

1

Theories of Political Influence

This section presents three theories concerning the impact of elections on mortgage markets: the Political Uncertainty, Political Business Cycle, and Partisan Differences accounts.3 The section describes each
3 A fourth perspective holds that elections affect economic outcomes through cronyism. In this telling, firms or industries that
are well-connected to newly elected officials prosper and those connected to the old regime suffer. This fourth theory is beyond
the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, to the extent that plaintiff-side consumer-protection lawyers are major donors to Democratic
AGs (Zambrano 2018) and business interests are key contributors to Republican AGs (Bennett 2018), the notion that Democratic or
Republican officials could adopt, respectively, a strong or weak regulatory enforcement posture to satisfy their donors seems plausible.
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account’s theoretical underpinnings and previous empirical tests.

1.1

Political Uncertainty

The notion that uncertainty generates an investment cycle is well-established in economic theory (Bloom,
Bond, & Van Reenen 2007; Dixit & Pindyck 1994; Bernanke 1983). In brief, when deciding when to time
irreversible investment decisions, firms weigh the prospect of generating additional revenue by investing
early against the possibility of learning valuable new information by waiting. As uncertainty regarding
the long-run implications of a future event increases, so does a firm’s option value of deferring investment
decisions. As a consequence, investment levels fluctuate cyclically, as firms hold back on investing prior to
significant events (Bernanke 1983).
The periods preceding elections generate one prominent form of uncertainty. Because officeholders adopt
different priorities bearing on firms’ bottom lines, uncertainty regarding the winner of a future election
may dampen current economic activity (Julio & Yook 2012). Indeed, a large empirical literature generally
confirms this theory concerning asset prices and firm investment decisions (for a review of this literature,
see Goodell & Vahamma 2013). This literature tends to focus on presidential elections. Nonetheless, several
studies examine state-level political uncertainty; gubernatorial elections are inversely related to corporate
investment by firms headquartered in that state (Jens 2013), IPOs by in-state firms (Colak et al. 2017),
and in-state municipal bond issuance (Gao & Qi 2013). On the other side, Waisman et al. (2015) find no
connection between gubernatorial elections and the cost of corporate debt for in-state firms.
A second constellation of studies demonstrates how economic policy uncertainty—from sources other than
upcoming state-level elections—adversely affects the housing market. Policy uncertainty is inversely related to loan supply (Bordo, Duca, and Koch 2016) and housing prices (Bahmani-Oskooee 2017; Antonakakis et al. 2016). Industry groups advance similar claims. For instance, a think tank affiliated with the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce asserts that “uncertainty over continued litigation” by political officeholders
has resulted in “Americans no longer hav[ing] access to the necessary capital to buy a home” (Pincus 2014).
Following the financial crisis, bankers criticized the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) for granting rule-writers and regulatory enforcers wide discretion, thus
contributing to policy uncertainty and depressing lending activity (Bordo, Duca, & Koch 2016).
Within these literatures, Kara & Yook (2020) and Canes-Wrone & Park (2014) are the studies closest to
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ours. The former finds that banks reduce the number and value of mortgages, in various states, that they
originate or hold on their balance sheets prior to gubernatorial elections in the state in which the banks are
headquartered. The latter reports that home sales and the sale prices for those transacted homes decline in
the lead-up to in-state gubernatorial elections.
Our test of the Political Uncertainty Account builds on these studies in several respects. First, we analyze
the effects of political uncertainty on a larger set of mortgage-market features. Because state officials’ powers over mortgage lenders focus largely on permissible loan terms and foreclosure procedures, we examine
the number of mortgages with high-risk features and the proportion of loans that later result in default or
foreclosure in addition to the number of loans originated and the corresponding home values.
Second, we examine AG elections as well as gubernatorial elections. As detailed below, AGs play a crucial
role in enforcing mortgage-finance laws at the state level. With Dodd-Frank’s empowerment of state AGs
to enforce a broad set of federal laws, the Chamber of Commerce argues that AGs “can add significant
uncertainty and costs to a business community that needs predictability and reliability” (Pincus 2014).
Third, and relatedly, including AGs also may enable us to disentangle effects that are grounded in borrowers’ versus lenders’ political uncertainty. An unstated assumption of much of the literature concerning
presidential elections is that firms’ uncertainty around these elections reduces economic activity. But some
consumers presumably also have beliefs regarding the effect of presidential transitions on the macroeconomy or their own economic prospects. Most studies that find economic effects of policy uncertainty around
presidential elections generally do not weigh in on whether these effects are driven by supply- versus
demand-side uncertainty.
Our research design, by contrast, may provide some purchase on this question. When deciding whether to
take out a mortgage to purchase a home, individuals face the same largely irreversible investment decision
and uncertain future economic conditions as do lenders. These future conditions hinge in part on the
outcomes of upcoming state gubernatorial and, as detailed below, especially AG elections. Yet borrowers’
information deficit concerning the likely impact of various possible election outcomes on mortgage markets
likely is far greater than lenders’. Put bluntly, AG elections are simply too obscure for most voters to follow.
Consider that only one-third of survey respondents can recall their AG’s name—to say nothing of his or
her views and priorities (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1992). Assuming that borrowers are mostly unaware of
potential changes in their state AG’s enforcement posture following an election, one can infer that changes
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in mortgage markets around an AG election are largely attributable to shifts in lenders’ behavior rather
than that of borrowers.

1.2

The Political Business Cycle

The Political Business Cycle Account offers an alternative perspective regarding the influence of politics
on markets. Nordhaus (1975) posits that incumbent politicians manipulate fiscal and, to the extent possible, monetary policy prior to an election to reduce unemployment, thus boosting their reelection prospects.
After they are reelected, they enact austerity measures to address the inflation that their pre-election expansionary policies produced—thus causing unemployment to increase. In this way, unemployment falls then
rises, and inflation rises then falls, on either side of an election.
Moving beyond the Phillips curve, incumbents also may opportunistically pursue policies that boost market returns prior to an election—with a course correction after Election Day (see, e.g., Lewis-Beck, 1988).
Myriad studies have tested this theory, mostly using policy instruments like tax and transfer programs, and
mostly yielding confirmatory results (Dubois, 2016).
Although the literature on the political business cycle tends to focus on national leaders, the same logic
applies to governors. According to Peltzman (1987), governors’ powers are comparable to those of “an
executive in a small open economy without a central bank.” Although only a limited literature exists regarding political business cycles at the state level, the existing evidence is equivocal. Chang, Kim, & Ying
(2009) find statistically significant changes in spending around gubernatorial elections, but Nelson (2000)
finds no difference in tax rates for before and after state elections. Our results contribute to this literature by
narrowly and comprehensively studying the effect of state political business cycles on mortgage markets.
Moreover, our research design allows us to separate the effect of political business cycles from the opposing
pressures of policy uncertainty. If policy uncertainty depresses economic activity prior to an election, but
political business cycles push incumbent candidates to boost economic activity prior to elections, the combined effect may appear as if neither effect is at work. To disentangle these channels, we use a binding term
limit design to separately identify the policy uncertainty effect, allowing us to infer the effect of political
business cycles alone by contrasting the two results.
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1.3

Partisan Differences

The final theory of political influence on mortgage markets emphasizes partisanship. On this account, because Democrats generally pursue more aggressive regulation and enforcement than Republicans, lenders
adopt a more cautious approach to lending when Democrats are in office and a more spendthrift posture
when Republicans control the reins.
This Partisan Differences Account gestures to theoretical (Alesina 1987) and empirical work (Alesina &
Roubini 1992) showing that in a two-party system in which the parties have different goals concerning unemployment and inflation, changes in party control will systematically affect these variables in a “partisan
cycle.” In the United States, the parties adopt markedly different postures concerning enforcement of environmental (Atlas 2007), antitrust (Moe 1982; Wood & Anderson 1993), consumer-protection, and securities
regulations (Moe 1982). In the depths of the 2008 financial crisis, liberal lawmakers were more likely than
conservatives to vote for emergency legislation to assist homeowners near or in default, controlling for
their own constituents’ default rates (Mian, Sufi, & Trebbi 2010).4 At the state level, Republican control of
statehouses and governorships is associated with the repeal of restrictions on bank branching (Kroszner &
Strahan 1999).
Party divisions have increased substantially in recent decades, with liberals sorting into the Democratic
Party and conservatives to the GOP at both the federal and state levels (Shor & McCarty 2017; McCarty,
Poole, & Rosenthal 2006). Concomitantly, the parties have adopted distinct and increasingly entrenched
views on the proper scope of financial regulation (Pickerill & Bowling 2014). Indeed, among the 23 elected
Democratic AGs serving in 2020, seven included consumer financial protection among the small number
of topics highlighted on the “issues” or “priorities” page on their most recent campaign website. For the 19
elected Republican AGs serving in that year, the figure is zero.
These differences raise the prospect that state-level mortgage-finance and consumer-protection policies are
subject to partisan swings. In a polarized political climate, a rational firm could be presumed to alter its
lending behavior based on the party that controls its regulator. Depending on the context, however, the
literature has found mixed effects of state partisanship on policy and market outcomes. Beland (2015) and
Fredriksson, Wang, and Warren (2013) both find significant impacts of state gubernatorial partisanship on
4 Ideological sorting between the parties indicates that the ideological positions of the members of Congress in Mian et al.’s study
closely predict their partisan affiliations (McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal 2006).
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racial earnings gaps and tax policy, respectively. However, in a comprehensive study of ideological policymaking and their real outcomes, Leigh (2008) finds no consistent effects of state gubernatorial partisanship
on individual’s physical or financial well being.

2

The State Law & Politics of Mortgage Finance

We test these theories by examining fluctuations in state-level mortgage markets during the period around
state elections. Testing these theories by probing changes in mortgage markets around state elections assumes, first, that state officials exercise influence over these markets and, second, that they may be differentially motivated to exercise this influence. To support the first assumption, this section describes the broad
powers that state officials hold in this area. We describe the expansive regulatory authority that state banking officials, who are appointed by the governor in most states, possess. We then introduce AGs—often
overlooked actors in political-economic research who possess substantial discretionary enforcement authority concerning mortgage finance. To support the second assumption, we detail the growing ideological
differences between the two parties at the state level and, relatedly, Democratic versus Republican officeholders’ electoral imperative to appeal to supporters and donors with divergent views on mortgage-finance
regulation.

2.1

Regulation by Gubernatorial Appointees

State banking regulators—who are appointed either directly by the governor or are appointed by the governor’s agent and removable at-will by the governor in 43 states (Council of State Governments 20042014)—play an important role in mortgage markets. For one, they determine whether to grant charters
to operate new institutions, assessing whether applicants have a reasonable likelihood of both financial
success and sound operations. Many state banking regulators impose interest rate ceilings or other antipredatory lending mandates as prerequisites to maintaining a charter (Zaring 2018). They supervise statechartered institutions for safety-and-soundness: monitoring these institutions’ risk profiles, assessing how
they manage these risks, and undertaking corrective action where necessary (Eisenbach, et al. 2016).5
In addition, state banking regulators license and oversee independent non-bank mortgage lenders—a growing share of the market (Kim et al. 2018)—and others involved in housing-finance, including mortgage
5 They

perform these functions in most cases alongside the Federal Reserve.
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brokers, loan processors, underwriters, and debt-collectors (Eggert 2011). Further, they are authorized to
enforce a broad array of state mortgage-lending and consumer protection laws, through administrative
proceedings and via the courts. Finally, Dodd-Frank’s dual-enforcement provisions empowered state regulators (and AGs) to bring civil actions to enforce federal consumer-protection and mortgage-finance laws
against state-chartered institutions.
State law grants state regulators wide latitude in exercising their powers (Pahl 2007). For instance, New
York State’s mortgage-servicing requirements—which are perhaps the most stringent in the nation—were
not issued by the state’s legislature, but as regulations by the state’s superintendent of banks (Eggert 2011).
In addition, many state laws permit regulators to grant exemptions from mortgage-brokerage and other
occupational-licensing requirements (Eggert 2011).6 In light of the discretion afforded to state banking
regulators, it is unsurprising that they adopt markedly different regulatory postures (Agarwal, Lucca, Seru,
& Trebbi 2011).

2.2

Enforcement by State AGs

AGs serve as their states’ chief law enforcement officers, and possess powers that, according to Provost
(2010), “nearly rival[] the governor’s office.” They are the primary enforcers of state mortgage-lending
laws, along with state prudential banking regulators in some states. In 42 states, the AG has standing to
enforce the state’s principal consumer- protection law. In most states, they also can file suit under their
state’s predatory lending, discriminatory lending, and mortgage-servicing statutes (Morris 2017).
Alongside local prosecutors, AGs are authorized to initiate prosecutions based on violations of any state law
in 46 states, and can intervene in, assist with, or take control of local prosecutors’ cases in most states (Lemos
2012). AGs have several tools at their disposal that are not available to the typical litigant. For instance,
they receive and investigate consumer complaints, which can be used to discern patterns of behavior, and
can issue civil investigative demands that allow for discovery prior to filing a complaint (Totten 2013).
The power to issue a civil investigative demand to reveal information prior to filing suit can serve as a
force-multiplier, alerting other actors to potential improprieties, which can spur changes apart from in-state
litigation. Further, under some laws, multiple AGs can band together across states (Engel 2016). Finally,
they have access to state funding, often supplemented by partnering with the plaintiffs’ bar (Wilkins 2010).
6 The

extent to which states examine non-bank lenders varies by state (McCoy 2019).
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AGs played a prominent role in the enforcement of mortgage-finance laws throughout our study period.
Prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank in 2010, when federal regulators adopted a largely hands-off approach, AGs aggressively pursued state-chartered financial institutions and non-bank lenders for predatory lending, discriminatory lending, and mortgage servicing abuses (Willis & Jackman 2010). Dodd-Frank
empowered AGs to go even further, enabling them, with limited exception, to enforce state law against nationally chartered lenders and to enforce federal law against all lenders (Totten 2015; Lemos 2012; Wilmarth
2011).

2.3

State Officials’ Place in the Political Landscape

Ideological differences between the two parties and, relatedly, the divergent interests of their supporters
may influence state officials’ exercise of these powers. Governors and AGs—who are directly elected in 43
states and the District of Columbia7 —must appeal to voters and donors to retain their positions or move
up (Lemos 2011).
Today, pursuing elected office largely entails emphasizing ideology and motivating one’s co-partisans (Nolette 2017). Over the past several decades, a deep ideological cleavage has developed at the state level
between Democrats and Republicans. Governors diverge on a host of economic issues (Brownstein &
Czekalinski 2013; see also Bulman-Pozen 2014) and band together in party-based associations of governors (Schleicher 2017).8 AGs also are divided. They exhibit a similar degree of polarization as members of
Congress (Bonica 2013)—a remarkably divided institution (Mann & Ornstein 2012). In fact, AGs in 35 states
in 2009-2010 were more ideologically extreme than the mean same-party state legislator (Bonica 2013).9
The two parties’ ideological divergence extends to consumer finance. In general, Democrats tend to favor
greater regulation and Republicans less (Poole & Rosenthal 2006). Concerning consumer finance specifically, nine of the twenty-four elected Democratic AGs who are currently serving include consumer financial
protection among the small number of issues that highlighted on the “issues” or“priorities” page on their
most recent campaign website. For the eighteen current elected Republican AGs, that figure is zero.
7 That

43 states also have a gubernatorial-controlled state banking regulator is coincidental.
A state’ s election of a Democratic versus a Republican governor has a demonstrable
(albeit somewhat modest) effect on the liberalism of that state’s policies (Caughey, Warshaw, & Xu 2017). The size of this effect,
however, is relatively modest compared to policy differences across states. By way of explanation, Caughey et al. note that governors’
need to engage with the legislature to pass laws promotes incremental changes. Not so, in several respects, concerning mortgagefinance regulations that are hashed out by gubernatorial appointees and ordinarily do not require the assent of the other branches.
9 This polarization has policy consequences. The political composition of the state’s electorate is the most important factor in
predicting whether an elected AG will join a multi-state enforcement action (Provost 2003).Further, coalitions of AGs signing Supreme
Court amici briefs have become more clear party-based in recent decades (Lemos & Quinn 2015).
8 Once again, these developments affect policy.
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State politicians’ pursuit of campaign contributions may exacerbate partisan divergence on consumerfinancial regulation. National donors play a growing role in state elections and are more polarized than
in-state voters (Bulman-Pozen 2014; Phillips & Lax 2012). Further, banking interests are particularly prominent supporters of the Republican Party. The American Bankers Association Political Action Committee
(PAC) was the largest business or labor donor to Republican candidates during the 2019-2020 election cycle, with credit unions’ PAC ranked eighth.10 By contrast, the first financial industry group to appear on the
Democrats’ list of top business or labor donors is the credit unions’ PAC in the fifteenth position (Center for
Responsive Politics 2020).
In light of the growing polarization between the parties, their differing stances on consumer-protection
measures, and the economic interests of their distinct donor classes, the assumption that state officials are
differentially motivated to exercise their influence over mortgage markets is reasonable.

3

Research Design

3.1

Hypotheses

The Political Uncertainty Account predicts that, as uncertainty concerning future policy increases in the
period preceding an election, lenders will exhibit greater caution, reducing the number of loans that they
originate. Further, those loans that are originated will be smaller in size and less likely to include terms that
lenders consider to be high risk, high reward. In other words:

• Hypothesis 1a: Lenders will exhibit a more restrained lending posture in the period immediately preceding a state gubernatorial or AG election, relative to the period immediately following the election.

We define “restrained lending posture” as fewer loans originated and, conditional on origination, lower
loan sizes, fewer high-risk adjustable rate features, and fewer high-risk balloon-payment features. We
also examine the fraction of mortgages originated during the relevant period that enter into default or
foreclosure within four years of origination. These variables proxy the riskiness of the loan, both through
metrics observable at origination and those, like loan performance, that are unobservable at origination but
10 Auto

dealers, who facilitate auto loan financing from banks for the vast majority of auto purchases (Levitin 2020), and thus are
players in consumer-finance markets, rank third.
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may be correlated with soft information used by lenders in the origination process. Because every election
in our sample is contested by candidates from both major parties, we assume that there is some degree of
uncertainty—albeit small in some cases—in each election.
The Political Uncertainty Account further predicts that elections with greater uncertainty will be associated
with even greater lending restraint. Accordingly, we next examine the subset of gubernatorial and AG
elections in which term limits apply. Because incumbency status is a key predictor of state election outcomes
(Ansolabehere & Snyder, 2002), elections in which term limits bar the incumbent from pursuing reelection
may give rise to higher policy uncertainty. Hypothesis 1b captures this logic.

• Hypothesis 1b: Lenders will exhibit a relatively more restrained pre-election lending posture for state
gubernatorial or AG elections in which the incumbent is facing a binding term limit.

The Political Business Cycle Account offers an opposing prediction: that incumbents will relax regulatory
enforcement in the period leading up to elections. With more borrowers approved—for larger loans and
more high-risk terms that are relatively easier for borrowers to meet in the short-term but more likely
to lead to foreclosure in the longer term—a permissive regulatory posture satisfies both borrowers and
lenders prior to the election. After the election, officials adopt a more aggressive stance in regulating highrisk lending, resulting in a more restrained lending posture after an election. Hypothesis 2 presents this
rationale.

• Hypothesis 2: Lenders will exhibit a more assertive lending posture in the period immediately preceding a state gubernatorial or AG election, relative to the period immediately following the election.

Finally, the Partisan Differences Account posits that differences in the party affiliations of state officials
impact lender behavior: that Democratic state officials are associated with more stringent regulation and
enforcement of mortgage lenders, and Republicans with greater leniency. Accordingly,

• Hypothesis 3a: A state switching from a Republican to a Democratic governor or AG will be associated with lenders adopting a more restrained lending posture in that state.
• Hypothesis 3b: A state switching from a Democratic to a Republican governor or AG will be associated with lenders adopting a more assertive lending posture in that state.
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Specifically, if Hypotheses 3a and 3b are correct, then we should observe that states that switch to Democratic officials have fewer loan originations but higher quality loans, with fewer risky contract features and
better performance. Further, post-switch Democrat-led states may have smaller loan amounts and lower
transacted house prices to reflect the lower availability of credit. Republican AGs and governors would
be associated with the opposite results. To summarize, Table 1 shows the expected post-election change in
lending posture that each of these hypotheses predict. After a state election, high-risk and overall lending
levels are hypothesized to fit the table below.
Table 1: Predictions of Post-Election Changes in Lending Risk
Theory

Elections w/
GOP-to-Dem.
Term-Limited
Transitions
Incumbent
After a state election, high-risk and overall lending levels will...
Political
Increase (H. 1a) Increase (H. 1b)
Uncertainty
Political
Decrease (H. 2)
Business Cycle
Partisan
Decrease (H.
Differences
3a)

3.2

All Elections

Dem.-to-GOP
Transitions

Increase (H. 3b)

Data

Our data combines a commercial loan-level mortgage dataset with data on state politics. Our political
data is a mix of existing data and hand coded information on AG and gubernatorial elections. First, we
collect data on the partisan affiliation of every elected governor or AG whose tenure in office included
any portion of the 2004-2013 period. To identify governors’affiliations, we start with a database of state
elections assembled by Carl Klarner (2013). This dataset covers state governor elections, including party
and election date, between 2004 and 2011. We extend this data to include all state governor elections until
2013 via biennial reports published by an association of state governments (Council of State Governments
2004-2014). We use these same reports to identify AGs’partisan affiliations. Combining these sources, we
assemble a comprehensive dataset of party control of these state offices at the state-year, along with election
dates.
Our mortgage market data comes from Black Knight’s McDash residential mortgage dataset. This large
dataset includes the majority of all residential mortgage loans originated in the United States during the
2004-2013 period. The dataset contains information on loans at origination, including loan-to-value ratio,
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interest rate, loan amount, the borrower’s debt-to-income ratio, whether the loan terms include a prepayment penalty, and the amount of mortgage insurance required as a percentage of the loan among. The
McDash dataset also includes panel data on loan performance, e.g., information on the amount of principal
outstanding over time, and whether or not the loan became delinquent, was modified, or was foreclosed on
in a particular period, among other variables. We use several of these variables as proxies to measure loan
performance and riskiness: probability that a loan carries prepayment penalty or adjustable rate, probability of balloon mortgage, whether a loan was in default for 90 days, and whether the loan was foreclosed
on.
The primary analysis involves aggregating mortgage data at the ZIP code-month level and then connecting
it to the data on elections and officials’ partisan affiliations. In so doing, we capture the number of loans
originated in a ZIP code area in a particular year, as well as average loan characteristics and the fraction
of loans that end up in delinquency, default, and foreclosure. After aggregating data to the ZIP code-level
and month, the sample contains 2,371,611 zip code-month-level observations. We refer to each of these
observations as a “market.” zip code-month We then limit the included zip code-month markets to only
those within 12 months on either side of an included state election. This limitation reduces our dataset to
681,960 markets. Table 2 reports summary statistics for these markets.
The mean zip code-month market reports 59.6 new loans originated, with a heavy right-skewed distribution. The mean property value is $303,946. Approximately 23.1% of the loans in the mean market include
a prepayment penalty clause, 15% are adjustable rate mortgages, and 3.5% are balloon mortgages. Table 2
also reports an average default rate of 12.5% and an average foreclosure rate of 4.8%.
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Number of Loans
House Price
Prepayment Penalty
Adjustable Rate
Balloon Mortgage
Default
Foreclosure
Observations

Mean
59.646
303,946
0.231
0.150
0.035
0.125
0.048

10th Perc. Median
4.000
15.000
110,941
208,000
0.000
0.208
0.000
0.067
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.091
0.000
0.000
681,960

90th Perc.
58.000
559,600
0.455
0.438
0.135
0.308
0.143

Notes: Summary statistics derived from 2004-2013 sample used in full analysis. Observations measured at the zip code
- month level.
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3.3

Empirical Strategy

Our empirical approach is to disentangle political fluctuations surrounding state elections from other determinants of shifts in mortgage markets. Specifically, we control for state and mortgage fixed effects and look
for a residual effect of elections on mortgage lending, characteristics, and performance. To assess the Political Uncertainty and Political Business Cycle Accounts, we test whether mortgage markets are smaller or
lending standards are tighter before versus after elections for governors and AGs. We then compare these
changes across elections with and without binding term limits on state officials. This analysis provides an
additional test of the Political Uncertainty Account, on the theory that open-seat elections generation additional political uncertainty, and market participants have early, complete information that an incumbent
will not be on the ballot where that incumbent is term-limited. To test the Partisan Differences Account, we
examine whether the elected official’s partisan affiliation impacts mortgage markets by comparing states
with a switch in party control of these positions to other states.11
This research design builds on past work in several respects. For one, state-level elections include greater
temporal and geographic variation than studies that examine national elections. Further, using mortgage
loans as the unit of analysis has an additional advantage firm-level investment decisions or stock prices
as the unit of analysis in other studies. Unlike these other units, individual mortgage loans are situated
entirely within a single state, and thus offer a cleaner test of the effect of state elections on firms’ in-state
behavior.

3.3.1

All Election Event Studies

First, we document patterns in mortgage market outcomes before and after governor and AG elections. To
do so, we use an event study approach, looking at the 12 months before and 12 months after the election
date.

Yst =

∑ β TimetoElect δTimetoElect + γs + γt + est

(3.1)

11 Standard errors are clustered at the state level in all models. Since the primary explanatory variable in each model varies at the
state level, clustering accounts for variation within states that should not drive variation on either side of an election or between
Democratic and Republican regimes (Cameron & Miller 2015).
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The left hand side variables of interest Yst include the total volume of loans, the size of the loan reflected by
the transacted house price, indicators for the loan type, including adjustable rate and balloon mortgages,
and indicators of performance, including default and foreclosure. Dummies δi are one for the month i and
zero otherwise. Fixed effects for state and month, denoted γs and γt , control for macroeconomic trends
and differences in mortgage market conditions across states. This model is run separately for governor
elections and AG elections. The result of the event study tests our Hypotheses 1a and 2. If β i for postelection months i = [1, 12] are consistently higher than the pre-election months i = [−12, −1], the pattern
would be consistent with the Political Uncertainty Account proposed in Hypothesis 1a. On the other hand,
if β 1 is consistently lower after the election, relative to before, the pattern would be consistent with the
Political Business Cycle approach laid out in Hypothesis 2. Our null hypothesis is that all values of β i are
statistically equivalent, and being unable to reject the null would serve as evidence that neither the Political
Uncertainty nor the Political Business Cycle story applied to state governor and AG elections.

3.3.2

Binding Term Limit Difference-in-Difference

Next, we ask whether elections subject to binding term limits, which give rise to higher policy uncertainty,
differ in their impact on mortgage market outcomes. To do so, we estimate the following model for both
governor and AG elections:

Yst = β BindingTL δBindingTL + β preElection δpreElection + λδBindingTL δpreElection + γs + γt + est

(3.2)

This model essentially uses a difference-in-difference approach, differencing outcome means before and
after the election, for elections where the incumbent faces a binding term limit minus those where the
incumbent may be re-elected. Hypothesis 1b predicts that if policy uncertainty is driving changes in market
outcomes around state elections, λ should be negative for outcomes indicating a robust mortgage market.
States in which term limits barred the incumbent AG or governor from running in an election in our sample
period are shown in Figures 1 and 2, respectively.

3.3.3

Partisanship Difference-in-Difference

Finally, we utilize difference-in-difference models to compare states with “switch elections”—i.e., states
in which control of the governorship or AG’s office switched from a Democrat to a Republican (or vice-
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Figure 1: State AG Term Limit Map

States with AG elections where incumbents faced a binding term limit at some point in our 2004-2013 sample period
are highlighted in orange; states without such an election are in blue.

Figure 2: State Governor Term Limit Map

States with governor elections where incumbents faced a binding term limit at some point in our 2004-2013 sample
period are highlighted in orange; states without such an election are in blue.

versa)—to a control group where the relevant office stayed in the same party’s hands. Comparing mortgage
outcome differences in switch- versus non-switch states, both before and after elections, provides a more
granular look at the effect of partisanship on mortgage markets than the previous, more general differencein-means models could.
To do so, we generate four switch databases: one each for the election of Republican AGs, Democratic AGs,
Republican governors, and Democratic governors. The composition of each dataset is reported in Figures 4
and 3. The correlation between the election of a Republican AG and mortgage outcomes relies on comparing

17
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3385963

the dark blue states to the light blue states in Figure 4, while the analogous correlation for Democratic AGs
is measured by comparing the dark red states to the orange states. Yellow states—which experienced both a
Republican-to-Democrat and Democrat-to-Republican switch during the study period—also are included.
White states—i.e., states in which the AG is an appointed position—are excluded. Similar comparisons are
done in Figure 3.
Figure 3: State Governor Election Map

Notes: Figure depicts states included in the treatment and control groups for the Governor switch analysis. Democratto-Democrat states act as controls for states that receive the Democrat-to-Republican treatment, while Republican-toRepublican states are controls for Republican-to-Democrat states. "Both Switch" states are treatment groups for both
experiments, because they see party turnover twice in our sample period. "No Data" states have appointed, rather than
elected, AGs. Alaska and Hawaii are excluded from the map but are included in the analysis.

We use a difference-in-difference specification to study the effect of partisan switches. The estimating equation, below, includes fixed effects for state and time to account for economic fluctuations in the mortgage
market.

Yst = β SwitchState δSwitchState + β postElection δpostElection + αδSwitchState δpostElection + γs + γt + est

(3.3)

This strategy relies on two key identifying assumptions. First, loan characteristics, counts, and performance
within “switch states” were not already on a different trend than loan characteristics, counts, and performance in control states before the election.12 Second, no other changes that would systematically affect
mortgage markets occurred contemporaneously with party switch elections that would directly influence
loan performance and characteristics. If these assumptions are true, α can be interpreted as the causal effect
12 Evidence

of parallel pre-trends can be obtained using an event-study approach and are available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 4: State AG Election Map

Figure depicts states included in the treatment and control groups for the AG switch analysis. Democrat-to-Democrat
states act as controls for states that receive the Democrat-to-Republican treatment, while Republican-to-Republican
states are controls for Republican-to-Democrat states. "Both Switch" states are treatment groups for both experiments,
because they see party turnover twice in our sample period. "No Data" states have appointed, rather than elected, AGs.
Alaska and Hawaii are excluded from the map but are included in the analysis.

of electing a state official from a political party on mortgage lending posture. Note that this model can also
be interpreted as a correlation if the identifying assumptions are violated.
A significant negative coefficient α in elections of Democratic officials would provide evidence in favor of
Hypothesis 3a, meaning that Democrats are associated with a more restrained lending posture. On the
other hand, a significant positive coefficient in elections of Republican officials would support Hypothesis
3b, in which Republicans are associated with less restrained lending. Our null hypothesis is that α is zero,
which would suggest that neither partisanship story is supported in our data.

4

Results

This section presents results for key indicators of mortgage market health, including indicators of overall
credit supply, risky lending, and loan performance. The first two of these variables—the number of new
loans and the house prices associated with these transactions—measure the overall health of the housing
market as well as the willingness of lenders to extend credit to mortgage borrowers. We then turn to two
indicators of risky lending: the fraction of loans with adjustable rates and balloon payments. Each of these
loan types has been associated with increased individual and aggregate financial risk, including during

19
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3385963

the 2008 financial crisis. Finally, we include two welfare-relevant measures of performance and financial
distress: default and foreclosure.13 Taken together, these variables represent aspects of the mortgage market
that reflect lending standards, with lower values of each variable being associated with a more restrained
lending posture.

4.1

Political Uncertainty and Political Business Cycles

4.1.1

Governor Elections

Figure 5 shows the relationship between state governor elections and key outcomes. State governor elections are not associated with systematically fewer loans originated before elections. Although a small increase in the number of loans appears five months after the election, this change is not persistent. Moreover, the size of the effect is economically insignificant, with an increase of less than 2 loans per zip code
in a month. The average property value, fraction of adjustable rate and balloon mortgages, and the rate
of default on these loans all show similar patterns —there is a slight upward trend after the election, but
there is no statistically significant difference in these outcomes pre- and post-election. In the occasional
months after the election where statistically significant effects arise, such as the higher fraction of balloon
mortgages originated five months after the election, the size of the effect is economically insignificant, with
the increase being less than .5 percentage points. Foreclosure rates are entirely unaffected by elections.
These results have two important implications. First, the lack of significant pre- or post-election trends
in the outcome variables suggests that state and time fixed effects adequately control for fluctuations in
the housing market. Second, the lack of either a significant expansion or contraction of lending posture
suggests that there is no support here for either the Political Uncertainty Account or the Political Business
Cycle Account of financial fluctuations. This may be due to both these effects being statistically insignificant
or due to the two effects opposing each other and resulting in a zero net effect.
To separate these explanations, we move to the term limit analysis that isolates and tests the policy uncertainty story. We estimate equation 3.2 to compare the difference in pre-election outcomes in elections where
incumbents face a binding term limit to those elections where no term limit binds on the incumbent.
The results are described in Table 3.The coefficient of interest is reported in row 3 show that there is no
difference in lending behavior before term limit elections, relative to elections in which the incumbent
13 Note:

Our data also includes a variety of other metrics. These results are available on request.
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Figure 5: Impact of Governor Elections

Figures depict mortgage-market outcomes during the 24-month period around gubernatorial elections. Measured at
the zip-month level for the 2004-2013 period. The coefficients δi from 3.1 are plotted in blaxk, with 95% confidence
intervals in gray. The excluded category is the month prior to the election. Regressions include time and state fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table 3: Governor Term Limits
(1)
# of Loans
1.698
(0.59)

(2)
House Price
-5838.5
(-0.58)

(3)
ARM Flag
-0.00967
(-0.47)

(4)
Balloon Flag
0.000897
(0.22)

(5)
Foreclosure
-0.00332
(-0.65)

(6)
Default
0.000543
(0.05)

Pre-Election

-0.620
(-0.66)

-1491.8
(-0.86)

-0.00536
(-0.84)

-0.000459
(-0.42)

0.000246
(0.19)

0.0000806
(0.04)

Binding TL * Pre-Election

0.911
(0.34)

-2040.6
(-0.93)

0.000376
(0.07)

0.0000426
(0.02)

0.000456
(0.17)

-0.00234
(-0.59)

34.25∗∗∗
(18.84)
2255475

265943.5∗∗∗
(54.13)
2243624

0.162∗∗∗
(13.73)
2255475

0.0337∗∗∗
(17.19)
2255475

0.0475∗∗∗
(21.74)
2255475

0.115∗∗∗
(22.18)
2255475

Binding TL

Constant
N
t statistics in parentheses
∗

p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Table reports results from equation 3.2, utilizing the dataset of outcomes at the zip-month level between 2004 and 2013
covering the 24-month period surrounding gubernatorial elections. Each column includes time and state fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

may remain for another term. Moreover, the results in row 2 reiterate that for all of our proxies for lending
posture are statistically equivalent in the pre-election period to the post-election period. These results do not
support Hypothesis 2. Alongside the event study results above, we can conclude that there is no evidence
in our data for either the Political Uncertainty Account or the Political Business Cycle theory.

4.1.2

AG Elections

Figure 5 shows the impact of AG elections on mortgage lending. The number of loans does not change
significantly around the election, though a slight downward trend can be seen after the election. The size
of mortgages do not vary significantly, with house price remaining constant before and after the election,
with an economically small exception in the form of a drop in house prices 8 months prior to the election.
Significant cyclical behavior can be seen in the origination of adjustable rate mortgages, with a higher rate
of ARM lending prior to the election and a 1% drop after the new AG is elected. No significant effects
are present concerning balloon mortgages, defaults, or foreclosures, despite occasional months with statistically significant coefficients. Taken together, only ARM originations show consistent support for any of
our hypotheses. The direction of the effect is consistent with a political business cycle, and is not consistent
with political uncertainty.
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Figure 6: Impact of AG Elections

Figures depict mortgage-market outcomes during the 24-month period around AG elections. Measured at the zipmonth level for the 2004-2013 period. The coefficients δi from 3.1 are plotted in blaxk, with 95% confidence intervals
in gray. The excluded category is the month prior to the election. Regressions include time and state fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table 4: AG Term Limits
(1)
# of Loans
-1.098
(-0.23)

(2)
House Price
-13359.9
(-0.90)

(3)
ARM Flag
-0.00165
(-0.06)

(4)
Balloon Flag
0.00190
(0.38)

(5)
Foreclosure
-0.0258∗
(-2.13)

(6)
Default
-0.0173
(-1.35)

Pre-Election

1.018
(1.69)

-814.0
(-0.70)

0.000307
(0.14)

-0.000997
(-1.19)

-0.000871
(-0.59)

-0.00187
(-1.03)

Binding TL * Pre-Election

-3.052
(-1.65)

8304.1
(1.98)

-0.00426
(-0.76)

0.00247
(1.19)

0.0113
(1.73)

0.00467
(0.72)

38.45∗∗∗
(104.77)
1825486

268484.9∗∗∗
(327.37)
1818115

0.158∗∗∗
(113.80)
1825486

0.0347∗∗∗
(88.26)
1825486

0.0485∗∗∗
(54.29)
1825486

0.117∗∗∗
(115.76)
1825486

Binding TL

Constant
N
t statistics in parentheses
∗

p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Notes: Table reports results from equation 3.2, utilizing the dataset of outcomes at the zip-month level between 2004
and 2013 covering the 24-month period surrounding AG elections. States with appointed AGs are excluded. Each
column includes time and state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

To confirm that our data does not support a Political Uncertainty Account, we assess whether elections
in which term limits bar the incumbent from running are associated with a more restrained pre-election
lending posture, compared to elections in which the incumbent is not term-limited. The results shown in
Row 3 of Table 4 demonstrate that no outcomes are significantly different in binding term limit elections.
However, the coefficients reported in Row 3 are larger and much closer to statistical significance than those
reported for gubernatorial elections in 3. For instance, house prices seem slightly higher prior to AG elections with binding term limits, which directly contradicts the prediction of Hypothesis 2. Accordingly, we
find no evidence to support the Policy Uncertain Account. Some results concerning AG elections—but not
gubernatorial elections—are consistent with the Political Business Cycles Account, however.

4.2

Partisan Differences

Next, we turn to examining “party switches”—or transitions from a Democrat to a Republican official, or
vice-versa—within a given state. We employ a difference-in-difference framework to assess whether states
in which party control of these offices switches exhibit changes in mortgage outcomes, relative to a set of
“control” states in which no change in party control occurred. The goal is to test Hypothesis 3a and 3b
regarding the role of state electoral partisanship in affecting mortgage markets.
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4.2.1

Republican-to-Democrat Switches

First, we test whether our data shows any support for Hypothesis 3a, which posits that electing Democratic
governors and AGs should be associated with a more restrained lending posture, specifically due to threats
of regulatory oversight as suggested by political rhetoric. Table 5 reports the effect of electing a Democratic governor, comparing Republican-to-Democrat governor switches to states that retained a Republican
governor. Row 2 shows that there are no statistically significant effects of electing a Democratic governor.
These null results suggest that the election of a Democratic governor does not impact mortgage lenders or
the housing market.
Table 5: Republican-to-Democratic Governor Switches

After Election
After Party Switch
Constant
Observations

(1)
# of Loans
-20.97∗
(-2.07)

(2)
House Price
3622.5
(0.27)

(3)
ARM Flag
-0.00468
(-0.13)

(4)
Balloon Flag
0.00686
(0.90)

(5)
Foreclosure
-0.00548
(-0.60)

(6)
Default
-0.0161
(-1.09)

22.63
(1.68)

-2024.7
(-0.14)

0.00724
(0.17)

-0.00361
(-0.61)

-0.00891
(-1.63)

0.00991
(0.90)

64.74∗∗∗
(47.53)
466733

318619.1∗∗∗
(95.36)
466437

0.167∗∗∗
(25.05)
466733

0.0385∗∗∗
(14.98)
466733

0.0580∗∗∗
(15.39)
466733

0.137∗∗∗
(25.24)
466733

t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Table reports results from estimating equation 3.3. The coefficient of interest is labeled “After Party Switch.” Treated
states elect a Democratic governor after a Republican, while control states have Republican governors before and after
the election. All regressions include state and time fixed effects. The "switch state" variable is collinear with fixed effects
and excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Then, we consider the impact of electing Democratic AGs, comparing states that switch from a Republican
to a Democratic AG to those where Republican AGs remain before and after the election. Once again, we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that these features do not differ in switch states relative to the relevant set
of control states, as shown in Table 6. Compared to the effect of electing a Democratic governor, however,
the lending market appears to react more strongly in the expected direction—the coefficients on the effect
on house prices and foreclosures are economically significant, though not statistically significant. Though
it is more likely that Democratic AGs may have an impact on lending than Democratic governors, there is
no evidence in this dataset to suggest that the rhetoric of the Democratic Party, including their assurances
of strong regulatory oversight of mortgage markets, is merely cheap talk.
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Table 6: Republican-to-Democrat AG Switches

After Election
After Party Switch
Constant
Observations

(1)
# of Loans
-31.45∗∗
(-3.64)

(2)
House Price
-17676.4
(-1.55)

(3)
ARM Flag
-0.00804
(-0.35)

(4)
Balloon Flag
-0.00539
(-1.02)

(5)
Foreclosure
0.00797
(0.89)

(6)
Default
0.0127
(0.94)

4.090
(0.21)

-13424.3
(-1.16)

-0.0296
(-0.76)

-0.000318
(-0.06)

-0.0138
(-1.40)

-0.00571
(-1.06)

73.68∗∗∗
(17.86)
276499

224370.1∗∗∗
(43.55)
276284

0.170∗∗∗
(19.37)
276499

0.0503∗∗∗
(20.35)
276499

0.0662∗∗∗
(13.27)
276499

0.152∗∗∗
(21.77)
276499

t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Table reports results from estimating equation 3.3. The coefficient of interest is labeled “After Party Switch.” Treated
states elect a Democratic AG after a Republican, while control states have Republican AG before and after the election.
All regressions include state and time fixed effects. The “switch state” variable is collinear with fixed effects and
excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

4.2.2

Democrat-to Republican Switches

Next, we test Hypothesis 3b by studying the impact of electing Republican governors and AGs, compared
to states which consistently have Democratic governors and AGs. Table 7 reports the impact on mortgage markets of switching from a Democrat to a Republican governor, relative to those states in which the
Democratic Party retained control of the governorship. As row 2 of the table shows, these models yield
null results except in mortgage defaults. Democrat-to-Republican governor switches are associated with a
4.4 percentage-point reduction in the default rate, or nearly 25% relative to the baseline. This striking effect
runs counter to partisan rhetoric regarding Republican officials, who do not typically promise crackdowns
on risky lending in their campaigns.
We conduct a parallel analysis for states in which the party controlling the AGs’ office switches from Democrat to Republican. The results are shown in Table 8. As with the governor switches, we see that AG party
switches do not have statistically significant impacts on most mortgage market outcomes. The only exception is in the number of loans, which increase by 16 loans per zip-month after a Republican AG is elected,
which is equivalent to approximately 23% relative to the baseline. This increase is more in accord with the
typical partisanship story. There are two broad takeaways from these results. First, Republican officials
generally do not universally expand lending markets. Second, the officials that do deliver on their partisan
promises, if any, are more likely to be AGs than governors.

26
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3385963

Table 7: Democrat-to-Republican Governor Switches
(1)
# of Loans
-13.29
(-0.85)

(2)
House Price
23710.4∗
(2.13)

(3)
ARM Flag
0.00569
(0.33)

(4)
Balloon Flag
-0.00589
(-0.99)

(5)
Foreclosure
0.0151
(1.52)

(6)
Default
0.0295∗
(2.18)

After Party Switch

-0.0816
(-0.01)

-33804.5
(-1.89)

-0.00622
(-0.24)

0.00384
(0.44)

-0.0226
(-1.48)

-0.0437∗
(-2.14)

Constant

95.94∗∗∗
(7.99)
298537

173656.3∗∗∗
(20.54)
298395

0.149∗∗∗
(13.24)
298537

0.0418∗∗∗
(12.09)
298537

0.0844∗∗∗
(11.25)
298537

0.179∗∗∗
(16.21)
298537

After Election

Observations

t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Table reports results from estimating equation 3.3. The coefficient of interest is labeled “After Party Switch.” Treated
states elect a Republican governor after a Democrat, while control states have Democratic governors before and after
the election. All regressions include state and time fixed effects. The "switch state" variable is collinear with fixed effects
and excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Table 8: Democrat-to-Republican AG Switches

After Election
After Party Switch
Constant
Observations

(1)
# of Loans
-30.08∗∗
(-2.89)

(2)
House Price
-6327.0
(-0.49)

(3)
ARM Flag
-0.00403
(-0.22)

(4)
Balloon Flag
-0.00771
(-1.62)

(5)
Foreclosure
-0.00276
(-0.29)

(6)
Default
-0.0151
(-0.88)

16.38∗
(2.10)

-1664.1
(-0.15)

-0.0182
(-0.81)

0.00380
(1.06)

-0.00855
(-1.00)

-0.00369
(-0.30)

67.62∗∗∗
(9.27)
427751

301969.2∗∗∗
(39.93)
427570

0.202∗∗∗
(28.19)
427751

0.0526∗∗∗
(16.02)
427751

0.102∗∗∗
(15.96)
427751

0.184∗∗∗
(18.75)
427751

t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Table reports results from estimating equation 3.3. The coefficient of interest is labeled “After Party Switch.” Treated
states elect a Republican AG after a Democrat, while control states have Democratic AGs before and after the election. All regressions include state and time fixed effects. The "switch state" variable is collinear with fixed effects and
excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

5

Discussion

In the aggregate, we cannot reject the null hypothesis associated with any of the accounts. In other words,
none of the three theoretical pathways of electoral influence on market activity finds support here.
These results contrast with significant effects of policy uncertainty on corporate investment (Jens 2016),
initial public offering activity (Colak, Durnev, & Qian 2017), and mortgage lending (Kara & Yook 2019), sig-
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nificant political business cycles in macroeconomics indicators around gubernatorial elections (Chang, Kim,
& Ying 2009), and significant impacts of gubernatorial partisanship on racial earnings gaps (Beland 2015)
and tax policy (Fredriksson, Wang, & Warren 2013). We demonstrate that state elections and partisanship
do not result in significant differences in real mortgage market outcomes, in line with work on redistributional policies (Dilger 1998), fiscal policy (Poterba 1994), state taxes (Nelson 2000), and state policies that
are ideologically salient (Leigh 2008).14 That our results contrast with studies of some policies areas and are
consistent with others suggests that the effects of politics on economic outcomes differ by sector.
The null results here are noteworthy. Abadie (2020) shows that in a large-sample setting without a substantial prior probably mass at the point null, “rejection of a point null often carries very little information,
while failure to reject is highly informative.”15 In other words, where (1) a large dataset is used (which
increases the likelihood of observing statistically significant results), and (2) the analyst has sound theoretical reasons to expect to see a statistically significant result, the failure ot reject the null hypothesis can be
highly informative. Both conditions are present here. This article (1) employs mortgage performance data
with the largest available coverage, which is large enough to interpret our results as a population effect, to (2)
test three well-established theories that offer unequivocal nonzero predictions. Given these conditions, our
null results are particularly informative.
Table 9 reproduces the earlier table showing the predicted post-election changes in lending, high-risk lending, and loan failures associated with each hypothesis. The table then reports the overall findings regarding
actual post-election changes.16
As Table 9 shows, there are no consistent and statistically significant results that point to any of the three
predominant theories by which electoral politics may distort the functioning of financial markets. These
results are consistent with elections and partisan transitions having little to no impact on mortgage markets.
Rather than reacting to state elections and political transitions, lenders may perceive a nationally cohesive
approach to mortgage-finance regulation. That AGs have a well-documented history of working across
14 Our results also are consistent with event studies showing the effects of adverse regulatory changes (rather than elections that
precipitating presumed regulatory changes, as in our study) on corporate valuations may be overstated (Coglianese & Walters 2020).
15 In consequence, increasing number of researches including Abadie (2020) “advocate[s] visible reporting and discussion of nonsignificant results in empirical practice” (see also Angrist et al. 2019; Abdulkadiroglu, Angrist, & Pathak 2014; Abadie 2006; and
Krueger & Maleckov 2003).
16 Although most of our findings paint a consistent picture of null effects, we do see statistically significant effects for three variables: AG elections are associated with a decrease in ARMs (but not concerning other high-risk features); Democrat-to-Republican
gubernatorial transitions are associated with fewer defaults (but not fewer foreclosures or the origination of mortgages with fewer
high-risk features that could lead to defaults); and Democrat-to-Republican AG transitions are associated with more new originations
(but, again, no other changes). There is no reasonable explanation for only these particular variables to be associated with elections and
political transitions—and only in a subset of elections, at that. That the coefficient estimates achieve conventional levels of statistical
significance in a few of the dozens of model specifications reported above may be spurious.
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Table 9: Predictions of Post-Election Changes in Lending Posture
Theory

Elections w/
GOP-to-Dem.
Term-Limited
Transitions
Incumbent
After a state election, high-risk and overall lending levels will . . .
Policy
Increase (H. 1a) Increase (H. 1b)
Uncertainty
Political
Decrease (H. 2)
Business Cycle
Partisan
Decrease (H. 3)
Differences
After a state election, high-risk and overall lending levels . . .
Gov. Elections
Unaffected
Unaffected
Unaffected

AG Elections

All Elections

Unaffected
except drop in
ARMs

Unaffected

Unaffected

Dem.-to-GOP
Transitions

Increase (H. 3)

Unaffected
except drop in
default
Unaffected
except increase
in # loans

state lines in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis provides support for this perspective. For instance, a
bipartisan coalition of 49 AGs negotiated a national settlement with mortgage servicers for abuses against
mortgage borrowers in 2012. In this account, stable mortgage markets around elections reflect predictable
and consistent regulation and enforcement.
Alternatively, our results could be consistent with multiple, cross-cutting dynamics—consistent with the
Policy Uncertainty, Political Business Cycle, and Partisan Differences Accounts—at play simultaneously.
These competing phenomena pull lenders in different directions. Perhaps the competencies and priorities
of the specific individuals holding these offices may cause one of these three accounts to predominate in
a particular state and year. In the aggregate, however, one observes null results. Thus, this placid surface
may hide strong, cross-cutting currents just beneath.
In either case, our results suggest that the growing power of state actors to regulate and enforce mortgage
markets, and financial markets as a whole, may be efficient. These results disrupt conventional wisdoms
based on the three major theories—each of which generates firm predictions that were not borne out here.
Instead, political pressures do not appear to distort markets, either in anticipation of state elections, or after
a change in leadership. Accordingly, these results mollify concerns that political actors’ increased role in
mortgage-finance regulation and enforcement, particularly as the shadow banking sector grows, will lead
to politics-induced inefficiencies.
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This article’s research design and findings make four additional contributions to the extant literature. First,
we expand on the types of political actors typically studied in election models. Although past literature
has considered the impact of presidential elections and state governor elections, the literature has largely
overlooked state actors with greater enforcement power, but lower public profiles, such as AGs. Our results
show that a greater number of significant results are present concerning AG elections than gubernatorial
contests. This result suggests that greater scholarly attention to AGs—who are relatively lower-profile than
governors but play a leading role in regulatory enforcement in many areas—is warranted.
Second, our uniquely detailed outcome data, including the number of loans originated, their size, and other
characteristics, allow us to pick up even small changes in mortgage markets.
Third, our analysis has implications for the use of event studies in financial markets outside the usual
context of corporate law and stock prices. A large literature uses the price at which financial assets are
traded, namely contemporaneous stock prices, to assess the effects of corporate litigation and regulation on
shareholder wealth (see, e.g., Coglianese & Walters 2020; Bhagat & Romano 2002). A slightly different set
of considerations arises when moving away from that setting, which focuses on investors’ beliefs about an
asset’s value, towards a context where the outcome of interest can be measured directly - the characteristics
of loans originated at different times in the political cycle. One issue that is often raised when using event
studies to assess the effect of regulatory changes is whether those changes have been anticipated by market
participants (Schwert 1981). Our setting directly tests this by developing and testing the Political Uncertainty Account, which is derived from anticipation effects. We see no evidence of anticipatory effects. To
validate our move away from traded asset prices to loan characteristics, we study multiple characteristics
of the loan market that, taken together, can provide a complete picture of risk taking and credit screening
in the mortgage loan market. Our approach adapts traditional event studies used to study the impact of
law to the broader context of elections and financial markets.
Finally, the null results reported herein are valuable on their own in this policy area. To the extent that publication bias in favor of statistically significant results provides scholars and policymakers with a distorted
picture (DellaVigna & Linos 2020), these findings provide a needed course correction.
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6

Conclusion

For many Americans, homeownership is synonymous with the “American Dream” (Shlay 2006). That
dream is made real via $15.8 trillion in outstanding mortgage loans (Howley 2020). The importance of
mortgage-finance to a broad swath of Americans, along with politicians’ attention to housing policy during
political campaigns and government’s close regulation of the sector, raises the question of how, if at all,
elections influence mortgage-market activity. In their lead-up, elections generate uncertainty regarding the
identities of future officeholders and, thus, their policies. After the votes are counted, the results may serve
as harbingers for post-inauguration changes in policy. Given these connections between elections and the
future regulatory environment facing mortgage lenders, the extant literature hypothesizes that electoral
pressures may impact financial markets via three channels: increased political uncertainty, cyclical changes
due to political business cycles, and inconsistent regulations due to partisanship.
Our analysis does not yield consistent support for any of these three channels. That finding raises the
possibility that state-level regulation and enforcement are steady in the face of political changes. When
political transitions do generate shifts in regulatory posture, those changes may be slow enough to enable
the market to gradually adjust. These results also leave open the possibility that several of the theoretical
dynamics are present at once, pushing lenders in different directions, perhaps to a degree that varies by
election.
Our results suggest that concerns that political uncertainty, electorally-motivated regulation, or divergent
partisan regulatory postures distort mortgage-lending markets may be overblown. Industry groups criticize the post-Dodd-Frank devolution of regulatory power to state actors, arguing that empowering a diverse set of politically motivated actors, whose identities change with elections, generates policy uncertainty and depresses lending (Pincus 2014; Bordo, Duca, & Koch 2016). That notion does not find support
here. Instead, these results suggest that increased regulatory power in the hands of state politicians may
have fewer costs and more benefits than previously predicted.
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A

Appendix

This appendix reports the results of two robustness checks. First, we re-run the models testing the Political
Uncertainty and Political Business Cycle Accounts excluding presidential election years. Then, we re-run
these models with additional demographic controls.

A.1

Excluding Presidential Election Years

As discussed above, studies testing the Political Uncertainty and Political Business Cycle Accounts have uncovered abnormal market behavior around presidential elections. To avoid simultaneous treatment effects
or any other contamination from presidential elections, we re-run the Political Uncertainty and Political
Business Cycle analyses excluding presidential election years.

17

As Tables 10 and 11 show, the results of this robustness check are consistent with our main analysis. For the
governor term limits results in Table 10, the coefficients are slightly larger, but the differences between elections in which the governor is term limited and other gubernatorial election are not statistically significant.
Figures 7 and 8 present results for the event-study analyses, excluding presidential election years, for gubernatorial and AG elections, respectively. Once again, these figure are substantially similar to those in the
main analysis.

A.2

Including Census Data

In addition to controlling for time-varying confounders that are specific to the zip-code level, we ran several
models with demographic covariates. Median household income, unemployment rate, and population are
common covariates in mortgage-market research. We obtain median household income and the population
estimates from Census data, and unemployment figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

18

17 We do not re-run the Partisan Differences models with this specification because the Partisan Differences Account does not imply
the prospect of simultaneous treatment effects of presidential election cycles and partisan switches in state officeholders.
18 Because these data are reported at the county level, we utilize a crosswalk developed by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development to match these data to the zip-code level. For cross-county zipcode areas, we average over the counties to be used as
controls.
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Figure 7: Impact of Governor Elections

Notes: Figures depict mortgage market outcomes before and after governor elections. Outcomes data are measured at
the zip-month level and cover the 24-month window around gubernatorial elections between 2004 and 2013. Elections
that were coincident with presidential elections are excluded. The coefficients δi from 3.1 are plotted in black, with 95%
confidence intervals in gray. The excluded category is the month prior to the election. Standard errors are clustered at
the state level.
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Table 10: Governor Term Limits
(1)
# of Loans
1.893
(0.57)

(2)
House Price
-5009.8
(-0.44)

(3)
ARM Flag
-0.0115
(-0.52)

(4)
Balloon Flag
0.000164
(0.04)

(5)
Foreclosure
-0.00265
(-0.50)

(6)
Default
0.00247
(0.20)

Pre-Election

-1.718
(-1.12)

-2881.6
(-1.23)

-0.0110
(-1.51)

-0.000689
(-0.38)

0.00110
(0.43)

0.00151
(0.41)

Binding TL * Pre-Election

1.318
(0.45)

-1167.0
(-0.52)

0.00252
(0.44)

0.000477
(0.28)

0.00162
(0.64)

-0.00220
(-0.54)

35.06∗∗∗
(15.02)
2063677

271278.1∗∗∗
(49.01)
2053183

0.173∗∗∗
(12.73)
2063677

0.0359∗∗∗
(17.17)
2063677

0.0467∗∗∗
(20.02)
2063677

0.114∗∗∗
(19.02)
2063677

Binding TL

Constant
N
t statistics in parentheses
∗

p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Notes: Table reports results from equation 3.2. Outcomes data are measured at the zip-month level and cover the 24month period around gubernatorial elections between 2004 and 2013. Elections that were coincident with presidential
election years are excluded. Each column includes time and state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state
level.

Table 11: AG Term Limits
(1)
# of Loans
-1.422
(-0.28)

(2)
House Price
-13252.4
(-0.80)

(3)
ARM Flag
-0.000315
(-0.01)

(4)
Balloon Flag
0.00258
(0.48)

(5)
Foreclosure
-0.0284∗
(-2.35)

(6)
Default
-0.0179
(-1.31)

Pre-Election

0.907
(1.14)

-735.6
(-0.36)

-0.000904
(-0.43)

-0.00142
(-1.16)

-0.000279
(-0.11)

-0.00115
(-0.35)

Binding TL * Pre-Elect

-1.781
(-0.89)

9218.0
(2.02)

-0.00517
(-0.81)

0.00303
(1.48)

0.0129
(1.91)

0.00700
(1.10)

39.43∗∗∗
(84.42)
1641423

274927.7∗∗∗
(211.87)
1635209

0.167∗∗∗
(108.05)
1641423

0.0372∗∗∗
(60.67)
1641423

0.0485∗∗∗
(36.36)
1641423

0.117∗∗∗
(65.64)
1641423

Binding TL

Constant
N

t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Notes: This table reports results from equation 3.2, utilizing the dataset of outcomes at the zip-month level between
2004 and 2013 covering the 24-month period surrounding AG elections, excluding elections that were coincident with
presidential election years. Each column includes time and state fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the
state level.

Once again, the results with these additional control variables are consistent with those reported above.
Results from the event-study analyses are reported in Figures 9 and 10; those for the term-limits analyses appear in Tables 12 and 13. Notably, the AG term limits analysis in Table 13 now report pre-election
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differences between term-limited and non-term-limited AG elections that are not statistically significant.
Otherwise, the results are substantially similar to those reported in the main text.
Finally, we re-ran the party switch analyses, which test the Partisan Differences hypothesis, with these
additional demographic controls. Tables 14-17 report these results. None of the coefficient estimates for our
variable of interest, After Party Switch, achieve conventionally accepted levels of statistical significance, with
one exception: Democrat-to-Republican governor switches are associated with a statistically significant
$33,731 decline in house price. That results cuts against the Partisan Differences Account, which predicts
that the turn to Republican administration will lead to an expansion of the credit supply.
Table 12: Governor Term Limits
(1)
# of Loans
-0.453
(-0.14)

(2)
House Price
-2402.4
(-0.34)

(3)
ARM Flag
-0.00745
(-0.40)

(4)
Balloon Flag
0.00107
(0.28)

(5)
Foreclosure
-0.00399
(-0.72)

(6)
Default
-0.000211
(-0.02)

Pre-Election

-0.952
(-0.85)

-1833.4
(-0.98)

-0.00526
(-0.86)

-0.000328
(-0.30)

0.000154
(0.12)

-0.0000679
(-0.03)

Binding TL * Pre-Elect

0.622
(0.31)

-3313.6
(-1.00)

-0.00125
(-0.24)

-0.0000302
(-0.02)

0.000506
(0.19)

-0.00196
(-0.48)

3.60e-4∗∗∗
(4.20)

7.311∗∗∗
(5.46)

2.28e-6∗∗∗
(6.02)

2.78e-7∗∗∗
(3.84)

-7.61e-8
(-1.18)

-3.58e-7∗
(-2.33)

Unemployment

-1.367∗
(-2.44)

-6393.4
(-0.78)

-0.00697
(-1.71)

-0.000262
(-0.58)

0.00184∗∗∗
(3.52)

0.00210
(1.79)

Population

3.07e6∗
(2.19)

0.0279∗∗
(3.28)

1.03e-8
(1.89)

1.45e-9
(1.56)

-7.66e-10
(-0.85)

4.56e-10
(0.39)

Constant

7.072
(0.79)
2077703

-70462.8
(-0.72)
2069102

0.0895
(1.96)
2077703

0.0204∗
(2.55)
2077703

0.0393∗∗∗
(5.89)
2077703

0.118∗∗∗
(7.60)
2077703

Binding TL

Mean Income

N

t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Notes: This table reports results from equation 3.2, utilizing the dataset of outcomes at the zip-month level between
2004 and 2013 covering the 24-month period surrounding governor elections, including controls for census variables.
Each column includes time and state fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table 13: AG Term Limits
(1)
# of Loans
1.518
(0.44)

(2)
House Price
-7485.5
(-0.83)

(3)
ARM Flag
-0.00173
(-0.07)

(4)
Balloon Flag
0.00219
(0.47)

(5)
Foreclosure
-0.0250∗
(-2.07)

(6)
Default
-0.0164
(-1.27)

Pre-Election

0.781
(1.26)

-2457.1
(-1.61)

-0.000783
(-0.30)

-0.00110
(-1.30)

-0.000695
(-0.47)

-0.00154
(-0.83)

Binding TL * Pre-Elect

1.633
(1.61)

19293.8
(1.55)

0.00665
(0.73)

0.00307
(1.32)

0.00867
(1.35)

0.00190
(0.30)

3.89e-4∗∗∗
(4.43)

7.592∗∗∗
(5.07)

2.38e-6∗∗∗
(5.64)

2.97e-7∗∗∗
(3.79)

-8.38e-8
(-1.12)

-3.06e-7
(-1.81)

Unemployment

-1.437∗
(-2.41)

-7836.6
(-0.88)

-0.00808
(-1.77)

-0.000391
(-0.86)

0.00174∗∗
(3.04)

0.00202
(1.71)

Population

2.96e-6∗
(2.22)

0.0277∗∗
(3.31)

1.02e-08
(1.89)

1.41e-09
(1.55)

-7.77e-10
(-0.87)

4.65e-10
(0.40)

Constant

5.789
(0.72)
1817375

-75113.1
(-0.70)
1810060

0.0880
(1.99)
1817375

0.0216∗∗
(2.96)
1817375

0.0411∗∗∗
(5.63)
1817375

0.117∗∗∗
(7.50)
1817375

Binding TL

Mean Income

N
t statistics in parentheses
∗

p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Notes: This table reports results from equation 3.2, utilizing the dataset of outcomes at the zip-month level between
2004 and 2013 covering the 24-month period surrounding AG elections, including controls for census variables. Each
column includes time and state fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Figure 8: Impact of AG Elections

Notes: Monthly event study graphs showing mortgage market outcomes before and after AG elections, using data at
the zip-month level for the 24 month window around every AG election between 2004 and 2013, excluding election
years that were coincident with presidential elections. Note that this sample excludes states where AGs are appointed
by the governor. Plotted in black are the coefficients δi from 3.1, with 95% confidence intervals in grey. The excluded
category is the month prior to the election. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

44
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3385963

Figure 9: Impact of Governor Elections

Notes: Monthly event study graphs showing mortgage market outcomes before and after governor elections, using
data at the zip-month level for the 24 month window around every governor election between 2004 and 2013, including
controls for census variables at the zipcode level. Plotted in black are the coefficients δi from 3.1, with 95% confidence
intervals in grey. The excluded category is the month prior to the election. Standard errors are clustered at the state
level.
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Figure 10: Impact of AG Elections

Notes: Monthly event study graphs showing mortgage market outcomes before and after AG elections, using data at
the zip-month level for the 24 month window around every AG election between 2004 and 2013, including controls for
census variables at the zipcode level. Plotted in black are the coefficients δi from 3.1, with 95% confidence intervals in
grey. The excluded category is the month prior to the election. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table 14: Republican-to-Democratic Governor Switches
(1)
# of Loans
-10.50
(-1.78)

(2)
House Price
26418.8
(1.63)

(3)
ARM Flag
0.00606
(0.21)

(4)
Balloon Flag
0.00675
(0.91)

(5)
Foreclosure
-0.00645
(-0.69)

(6)
Default
-0.0184
(-1.23)

13.65
(1.70)

-23295.7
(-1.24)

-0.00260
(-0.07)

-0.00347
(-0.59)

-0.00806
(-1.38)

0.0121
(1.07)

3.80e-4∗∗
(2.90)

8.198∗∗∗
(4.70)

2.51e-6∗∗
(3.62)

4.43e-7∗∗
(3.36)

-1.55e-7
(-1.77)

-3.59e-7
(-1.33)

Unemployment

-0.304
(-0.24)

-19167.6
(-1.55)

-0.0106∗
(-2.71)

0.000687
(0.89)

0.000930
(1.70)

0.00227
(1.11)

Population

1.23e-6
(0.94)

0.0298∗∗∗
(4.06)

8.35e-9∗
(2.46)

1.51e-9
(1.36)

-9.57e-10
(-1.94)

7.74e-10
(0.56)

Constant

8.776
(0.76)
464558

-19328.9
(-0.15)
464263

0.0952
(1.61)
464558

0.00909
(0.66)
464558

0.0613∗∗∗
(7.33)
464558

0.140∗∗∗
(5.36)
464558

After Election
After Party Switch
Mean Income

Observations

t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Table reports results from estimating equation 3.3. The coefficient of interest is labeled “After Party Switch.” Treated
states elect a Democratic governor after a Republican, while control states have Republican governors before and after
the election. All regressions include state and time fixed effects. The "switch state" variable is collinear with fixed effects
and excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table 15: Republican-to-Democrat AG Switches
(1)
# of Loans
-12.73∗∗
(-3.85)

(2)
House Price
4293.0
(0.36)

(3)
ARM Flag
0.00192
(0.11)

(4)
Balloon Flag
-0.00368
(-0.68)

(5)
Foreclosure
0.00726
(0.77)

(6)
Default
0.0103
(0.76)

4.902
(0.37)

-13013.2
(-1.45)

-0.0300
(-0.97)

-0.000339
(-0.07)

-0.0136
(-1.38)

-0.00524
(-0.93)

2.97e-4∗
(2.22)

4.881∗∗∗
(6.56)

1.49e-6∗∗
(3.16)

3.35e-7
(1.77)

-6.20e-8
(-0.54)

-5.97e-7∗
(-2.56)

-2.933
(-2.00)

-5213.7∗
(-2.18)

-0.0112∗
(-2.15)

-0.000734
(-0.77)

0.00173
(1.79)

0.000868
(0.36)

Population

8.73e-6∗
(2.53)

0.0211∗
(2.74)

1.88e-8∗
(2.68)

5.83e-9∗∗
(3.47)

5.78e-9
(1.23)

1.21e-8
(1.52)

Constant

33.79∗
(2.66)
275194

-5289.3
(-0.10)
274980

0.152∗
(2.81)
275194

0.0343∗
(2.37)
275194

0.0552∗∗∗
(6.20)
275194

0.170∗∗∗
(7.40)
275194

After Election
After Party Switch
Mean Income
Unemployment

Observations

t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Table reports results from estimating equation 3.3. The coefficient of interest is labeled “After Party Switch.” Treated
states elect a Democratic AG after a Republican, while control states have Republican AG before and after the election.
All regressions include state and time fixed effects. The “switch state” variable is collinear with fixed effects and
excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table 16: Democrat-to-Republican Governor Switches
(1)
# of Loans
-7.129
(-0.92)

(2)
House Price
30772.4∗∗∗
(3.95)

(3)
ARM Flag
0.00843
(0.54)

(4)
Balloon Flag
-0.00540
(-0.94)

(5)
Foreclosure
0.0147
(1.39)

(6)
Default
0.0263
(1.76)

3.056
(0.46)

-33731.8∗
(-2.20)

-0.00766
(-0.31)

0.00308
(0.37)

-0.0224
(-1.36)

-0.0386
(-1.63)

Mean Income

2.07e-4
(1.76)

4.660∗∗∗
(17.99)

1.38e-6∗∗∗
(3.82)

1.11e-7
(1.21)

-1.23e-7
(-1.15)

-4.00e-6
(-1.64)

Unemployment

-0.544
(-1.51)

-2704.1
(-1.07)

-0.000986
(-0.47)

-0.0000524
(-0.11)

0.00215
(1.97)

0.00507∗∗
(3.20)

5.31e-6∗∗∗
(7.76)

0.0356∗∗∗
(5.12)

2.34e-8∗∗∗
(6.68)

3.18e-9∗∗
(2.90)

3.48e-9∗
(2.57)

6.82e-9∗∗∗
(5.33)

77.74∗∗∗
(8.07)
295646

-148485.9∗∗∗
(-6.24)
295526

0.0310
(0.96)
295646

0.0296∗∗
(3.06)
295646

0.0751∗∗∗
(9.58)
295646

0.163∗∗∗
(8.86)
295646

After Election
After Party Switch

Population
Constant
Observations

t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Table reports results from estimating equation 3.3. The coefficient of interest is labeled “After Party Switch.” Treated
states elect a Republican governor after a Democrat, while control states have Democratic governors before and after
the election. All regressions include state and time fixed effects. The "switch state" variable is collinear with fixed effects
and excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table 17: Democrat-to-Republican AG Switches
(1)
# of Loans
-18.05∗
(-2.62)

(2)
House Price
6044.0
(0.48)

(3)
ARM Flag
0.000488
(0.03)

(4)
Balloon Flag
-0.00732
(-1.55)

(5)
Foreclosure
-0.00351
(-0.36)

(6)
Default
-0.0164
(-0.92)

12.07
(1.37)

-315.9
(-0.03)

-0.0193
(-0.90)

0.00416
(1.16)

-0.00831
(-0.96)

-0.00316
(-0.25)

Mean Income

2.33e-4
(1.44)

7.658∗∗∗
(6.43)

2.34e-6∗∗∗
(7.01)

2.98e-7
(1.85)

-3.80e-7
(-1.44)

-5.63e-7
(-0.97)

Unemployment

-2.018
(-1.56)

-13294.6
(-1.20)

-0.0110
(-1.76)

0.000317
(0.35)

0.00138
(1.63)

0.00295
(1.22)

Population

1.17e-6
(1.03)

0.0273∗∗
(3.65)

8.00e-09
(1.64)

1.52e-09
(1.63)

-2.39e-09∗
(-2.12)

-4.28e-10
(-0.21)

Constant

38.03
(1.90)
425214

-28394.2
(-0.31)
425033

0.132∗
(2.44)
425214

0.0315
(1.91)
425214

0.0723∗∗
(3.17)
425214

0.158∗∗
(2.85)
425214

After Election
After Party Switch

Observations

t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Table reports results from estimating equation 3.3. The coefficient of interest is labeled “After Party Switch.” Treated
states elect a Republican AG after a Democrat, while control states have Democratic AGs before and after the election. All regressions include state and time fixed effects. The "switch state" variable is collinear with fixed effects and
excluded. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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